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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-4-103(2)O). 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
1. Where appellant claims title under a December 19, 2011 Default 
Judgment against only the originating lender, obtained without notice to the trustee or 
the beneficiary under a Deed of Trust recorded in 2007, or to appellant (an assignee of 
the original lender), is appellant a bona-fide purchaser of the subject real property free 
iiiJ and clear of other parties of record? 
Standard of Review. Appellate courts review a district court's rulings on 
summary judgment motions for correctness. Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler v. Young, 2004 
UT 26, 94 P.3d 179, 182. 
2. Where appellant claims title under a December 19, 2011 Default 
~ Judgment, obtained without naming or personally serving the trustee or the beneficiary 
under a Deed of Trust recorded in 2007, or to appellant (an assignee of the original 
lender), did the Default Judgment release the Deed of Trust from the Property? 
Standard of Review. Appellate courts review a district court's rulings on 
summary judgment motions for correctness. Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler v. Young, 2004 
UT 26, 94 P.3d 179, 182. 
1 
3. Whether there are defects in the chain-of-title of Mortgage Electronic 
Registration Systems, Inc., which was the beneficiary of the Deed of Trust as nominee 
for lender and lender's successors and assigns? 
Standard o{Review. Appellate courts review a district court's rulings on 
summary judgment motions for correctness. Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler v. Young, 2004 
UT 26, 94 P.3d 179, 182. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves the parties' respective rights in real property located at 11213 
South Portobello Road, South Jordan, Utah. On October 15, 2013, Sterling filed its 
Complaint in this case alleging that Chase's Trust Deed on the real property was 
extinguished by a December 2011 Default Judgment. On September 4, 2014, Chase filed 
a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that its Trust Deed was not affected by the 
Default Judgment and that Chase has a senior lien interest in the real property. On 
March 30, 2015, the District Court granted Chase's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
dismissed Sterling's claims with prejudice. Sterling filed a Notice of Appeal on April 22, 
2015. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 19, 2007, Kimberly and Kip McRae (the "McRaes") executed a 
promissory note (the "Note") in the original principal amount of $900,000 for a mortgage 
loan on real property located at 11213 South Portobello Road, South Jordan, Utah (the 
2 
~ "Property"). (R. 46-48). The original lender under the Note was Taylor, Bean & 
Whitaker Mortgage Corp. ("TBW Mortgage"), which recorded a Deed of Trust in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, on April 24, 2007 as Entry No. 10076085 (the "Trust 
Deed"). (R. 51-67). The Trust Deed also named Mortgage Electronic Registration 
Systems, Inc. ("MERS") as the beneficiary on behalf of"Lender and Lender's successors 
and assigns," and First American Title was named as the trustee. (R. 51). As is common 
in the industry, TBW Mortgage later sold the Note, which was subsequently transferred 
@ multiple times to other lenders. (R. 69). The individual transfers of the Note were not 
made part of the public record at the County Recorder's office; however, MERS was the 
record beneficiary of the Trust Deed, and acted as an agent for all successors and assigns 
of the Note. (R. 51; 69). MERS tracked all transfers of the Note in its own electronic 
database. (R. 69). 
It is undisputed that Chase became the servicer of the Note on or about March 31, 
2009 and that the McRaes began making their monthly mortgage payments to Chase 
around that time. (R. 69; 71-84). On or about May 27, 2010, Chase became the owner of 
the Note and is currently in possession of the original endorsed-in-blank Note. (R. 43; 
69). 
On October 19, 2010, the McRaes filed a quiet title action in the Third District 
Court for Salt Lake County, Utah, Case No. 100920234 (the "Quiet Title Action"). (R. 
98-103). The McRaes named only TBW Mortgage as a defendant, but failed to name or 
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serve MERS or any successor ofTBW Mortgage, including Chase. (Id.). The McRaes 
also published notice of the Quiet Title Action to "unknown persons" on two occasions. 
(R. 228). On August 24, 2011, the McRaes transferred the Property to Sterling while the 
Quiet Title Action was still pending. (R. 105). 
When TBW Mortgage failed to respond to the McRaes' Complaint, the McRae's 
obtained a Default Judgment on December 19,201 l(the "Default Judgment") that quieted 
title in them against TBW Mortgage. (R. 107-108). The Default Judgment, prepared by 
the McRaes' attorney, stated in pertinent part that: 
Defendant Taylor, Bean & Whitaker ("Defendant") having been served 
with a Summons and Complaint ... and having failed to appear and 
answer ... , now upon application of Plaintiffs, judgment is entered against 
Defendant, in conformity with the relief requested in the Complaint, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: Plaintiffs are 
awarded quiet title judgment against Defendant. 
(Id). The Default Judgment was recorded on the Property on January 10, 2012. (Id.). 
After having obtained the Default Judgment, the McRaes continued making their 
monthly mortgage payments to Chase for almost a year, until October 2012. (R. 43, 71-
84). It was not until the Property was under contract for sale under a November 6, 2012 
Real Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC") that the McRaes stopped making payments 
under the Note. (R. 32). As a result, Chase received an assignment of the beneficial 
interest in the Trust Deed from MERS under a Corporate Assignment of Deed of Trust 
(the "Assignment") on February 6, 2013 to allow Chase to commence foreclosure in its 
own name. (R. 69; 85-86). 
4 
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On January 22, 2013, the prospective purchaser of the Property filed an action in 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah, seeking specific performance and damages 
against Sterling and the McRaes under the REPC when those parties refused to agree that 
the sales proceeds would be used to pay off the Trust Deed. (See Woolf v. Sterling 
Fiduciaries et al., Case No. 130900470 ("Woolf Lawsuit")). (R. 32; 110-158). On 
October 1, 2013, Chase filed a motion to intervene in the Woolf Lawsuit and 
subsequently filed a Complaint for foreclosure. (Id.). On October 15, 2013, Sterling 
filed this separate action against Chase. (R. 1-12). On September 4, 2014, Chase filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 26-39). On March 30, 2015, the District Court 
granted Chase's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed Sterling's claims with 
prejudice. (R. 273-277). Likewise, on October 2, 2015, the court in the Woolf Lawsuit 
entered summary judgment in favor of Chase, ruling that Chase's Trust Deed is a senior 
'-ii> lien and that Chase has the right to foreclose. (A copy of the October 2, 2015 ruling is 
provided herewith at Addendum A). The court in the Woolf Lawsuit also entered a 
Decree of Foreclosure and Order of Sale to allow commencement of the foreclosure. 
(Copies at Addendum B and Addendum C). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Sterling appeals the District Court's summary judgment ruling in favor of Chase 
on the grounds that Sterling claims it was a bona-fide purchaser of the Property, and that 
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Chase was served by publication as an "unknown" party in the quiet title action. These 
arguments fail. 
First, Sterling did not preserve below its claim to be a bona-fide purchaser. At no 
time was the issue of bona-fide purchaser alleged, presented to the Court, or ruled on in 
order to preserve it for appeal. Sterling waived this claim. 
Second, Sterling is not a bona-fide purchaser as a matter oflaw. Sterling had 
constructive notice of the Trust Deed, which was recorded four years prior to Sterling's 
interest. There is also no dispute that Chase was the known servicer of the mortgage loan 
when Sterling acquired its interest. Moreover, knowing that Chase, MERS, and First 
American Title had interests separate and apart from TBW Mortgage, Sterling was on 
inquiry notice to investigate further into those parties' interests. 
Third, the Default Judgment applied only to TBW Mortgage and did not release 
the Trust Deed from the Property. The Default Judgment was obtained without notice to 
Chase, MERS, or First American Title. Due process and Utah's quiet title statute 
required that those parties be named and personally served in order to affect their title. 
Service by publication was insufficient when MERS's and First American Title's 
interests were of record, and Chase was the known servicer of the loan. Notably, the 
court in the companion Woolf Lawsuit entered summary judgment in favor of Chase on 




Fourth, there are no defects in Chase's chain of title. MERS held the beneficial 
interest under the Trust Deed for the benefit of "Lender and Lender's successors and 
assigns" from the date the loan was originated in 2007 until the beneficial interest was 
assigned to Chase in 2013. There is also no dispute that Chase acquired ownership of the 
Note in 2010, which was prior to entry of the Default Judgment. Even if Sterling could 
show any defects in the chain-of-title, those would be immaterial because Chase is in 
possession of the original, endorsed-in-blank Note, which carries with it all rights to 
iirJ enforce the Note and Trust Deed as a matter of law. 
Therefore, the District Court's granting of Summary Judgment in favor of Chase 
should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
Sterling seeks to overturn the District Court's granting of Summary Judgment in 
.,ij) favor of Chase. Sterling argues on appeal that it was a bona-fide purchaser for value of 
the Property under Utah Code§ 57-3-103 because Chase had no recorded interest in the 
Property until February 6, 2013, when the Assignment of the Trust Deed from MERS 
was recorded. Sterling also argues that when the McRaes served unknown parties by 
publication in the Quiet Title Action, that was sufficient to effectuate service on Chase. 
Vil 
Appellate courts review a district court's rulings on summary judgment motions 
for correctness. Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler v. Young, 2004 UT 26, 94 P.3d 179, 182. 
"The appellate court will affirm the judgment, order, or decree appealed from if it is 
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sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such 
ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or 
action, and this is true even though such ground or theory is not urged or argued on 
appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not considered or passed 
on by the lower court." Blaisdell v. Dentrix Dental Sys., Inc., 2012 UT 37,, 5, fn 1. 
For the following reasons, Sterling's arguments fail and the District Court's 
Summary Judgment ruling should be affirmed. 
I. STERLING'S BONA-FIDE PURCHASER ARGUMENT WAS NOT 
PRESERVED BELOW 
Sterling's argument that it is a bona-fide purchaser for value is not properly before 
this Court because it was not asserted in the District Court. See, Wohnoutka v. Kelley, 
2014 UT App 154, , 4. ("An issue is preserved for appeal only if it was presented to the 
trial court in such a way that the trial court had an opportunity to rule on it"). To claim 
this doctrine, Sterling would have had to assert that it purchased the Property in good 
faith and for value, and that it was the first to record its interest in the property. See, Utah 
Code§ 57-3-103; see also, FDIC v. Taylor, 2011 UT App 416. This was not Sterling's 
theory below. Rather, Sterling alleged in its Complaint that the Default Judgment 
stripped TBW Mortgage of its interest in the Property. (R. 1-3). Sterling claimed that, as 
a result, TB W Mortgage had no interest to convey to any of its successors, including 
Chase. (Id.). For the same reasons, Sterling argued that MERS had no authority to 




~ Moreover, in its opposition to Chase's Motion for Summary Judgment, Sterling argued 
that the alleged securitization of the Note, and the terms of a purported Purchase and Sale 
Agreement (the existence of which has never been established), deprived Chase of the 
ability to enforce the Trust Deed. (R. 184-189). In other words, Sterling's challenge to 
Chase's interest below was centered on purported defects in Chase's chain-of-title, not on 
whether Sterling took its title in good faith, without notice of the Trust Deed. 
It is telling that the only citation to the record that Sterling relies on to claim that 
~ this issue was preserved is a case that Chase included in a string-citation, with no further 
discussion, in its Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment. (See R. 34; 
Appellant's Brief at p. 15). Sterling's reliance on Gregerson v. Jensen, 669 P.2d 396 
(Utah 1983), is misplaced because Chase cited to Gregerson as authority that documents 
do not have to be recorded to be enforceable. (R. 34 ). There was never any reliance on 
.:;;; that case by either party or the District Court for its discussion of the bona-fide purchaser 
doctrine. Whether Sterling was a bona-fide purchaser was never presented to or ruled on 
by the District Court. Wohnoutka, 2014 UT App 154 at 14. Therefore, Sterling waived 
any claim that it is a bona-fide purchaser of the Property and cannot raise it now for the 
first time on appeal. 
II. STERLING IS NOT A BONA-FIDE PURCHASER 
Even if Sterling had preserved the issue, Sterling's claim that it is a bona-fide 
purchaser fails on the merits. Utah Code§ 57-3-103 requires a bona-fide purchaser to 
purchase property in good faith and for value, and to be the first to record an interest. A 
9 
subsequent purchaser must take title without notice of a prior, unrecorded interest in the 
property. FDIC v. Taylor, 2011 UT App 416, ,r 35. Notice can include: (1) constructive 
notice, "which results from a record or is imputed by the recording statutes"; or (2) 
inquiry notice, "which is presumed because of the fact that a person has knowledge of 
certain facts which should impart to him, or lead him to, knowledge of the ultimate fact." 
Id. at ,r 36. Utah law prescribes that "each document ... shall, from the time of recording 
with the appropriate county recorder, impart notice to all persons of their contents." Utah 
Code§ 57-3-102(1). 
It is undisputed in this case that Sterling had constructive notice of the Trust Deed 
by virtue of its recording with the County Recorder on April 24, 2007. (R. 50). 
Sterling's interest, on the other hand, was not recorded until August 24, 2011, which was 
over four years after the Trust Deed was recorded. (R. 105). Therefore, Sterling took 
title with knowledge of the recorded Trust Deed. 
Sterling attempts to get around this by arguing that, although the Trust Deed was 
of record, Chase's interest was "unrecorded" until the 2013 Assignment. (Appellant 
Brief at pp. 15-16). This argument fails because MERS was the named "beneficiary" on 
the recorded Deed of Trust, and the "nominee" for "Lender and Lender's successors and 
assigns." (R. 51). As explained by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals: 
MERS is designated in the deed of trust as a "nominee" for the lender and 
the lender's successors and assigns as well as the "beneficiary" of the deed. 
MERS thus holds legal title to the security interest. If the lender sells or 
assigns the beneficial interest in the loan to another MERS member, the 
10 
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change is recorded only in the MERS database, not in county records, 
because MERS continues to hold the deed on the new lender's behalf. 
Commonwealth Property Advocates v. MERS, 680 F.3d 1194, fn. 1 (10th Cir. 2011) 
( emphasis added). 
Accordingly, MERS remained of record under the Trust Deed to ensure that the 
interests of all succeeding holders of the Note, including Chase, were protected. Ever 
since Chase acquired the Note in 2010, MERS was the beneficiary of record acting as 
agent for Chase. Due to MERS's assignment of the beneficial interest of the Trust Deed 
to Chase, Chase's interest relates back to the original date of recording in 2007. McEwan 
v. EiA Properties, LLC, 428 S.W.3d 633, 636 (KY App. Ct. 2014) {"The assignment of a 
~ mortgage generally does not affect its priority or inferiority as the mortgage's status is 
determined or fixed upon its initial recording"); Coventry Parkhomes Condo Ass 'n v. 
FNMA, 827 N.W.2d 252,257 (Mich. App. Ct. 2012) (A mortgage assignee has the same 
priority rights as the original mortgage assignor). This Court has upheld this role of 
MERS as valid under Utah law. See, Commonwealth Property Advocates, LLC v. MERS, 
2011 UT App 232; see also, Delo v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC, 302 P.3d 658 (Ariz. App. 
2013), discussed infra. Sterling attempts to sidestep its constructive notice of the 
recorded MERS interest by indicating (incorrectly) that only notice to TBW was required 
under the Note and Trust Deed and that MERS had no "independently recorded" interest. 
(Appellant Brief at p. 16, 17). These arguments are misplaced and do nothing to change 
the failure to serve any notice on MERS of either the Quiet Title action or the Default 
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Judgment therein on MERS, a party with an interest of record. Rather, as the District 
Court below correctly recognized, through MERS Chase held a recorded interest in the 
Property at all relevant times. 
Sterling's argument further fails because only TBW Mortgage's interest was 
quieted by the Default Judgment. As discussed more fully in Section III below, MERS 
and First American were not named or served in the Quiet Title Action. (R. 98-103). 
Therefore, their respective interests under the Trust Deed as beneficiary and owner-in-
trust of the Property were unaffected by the Default Judgment. Sterling has asserted no 
claim that it took title free of those recorded interests. 
Sterling also had inquiry notice of Chase's interest. As stated, by virtue of the 
Trust Deed, Sterling was on notice ofMERS's and First American's interests separate 
and apart from TBW Mortgage. Under the Trust Deed's plain language, Sterling was on 
notice that there may be successors and assigns to TB W Mortgage, and that the Property 
had been conveyed in trust to First American Title. (R. 51 ). Yet Sterling failed to 
investigate further. It is also undisputed that Chase's interest, at least as the loan servicer, 
was known prior to the entry of the Default Judgment. The McRaes had made payments 
to Chase for years and continued to do so for almost a year after Sterling took title to the 
Property. (R. 43, 69, 71-84). Had Sterling contacted MERS, First American Title, or 
Chase, it would have learned that Chase was the current owner of the Note secured by the 
Trust Deed. Utah law required Sterling to take those steps. FDIC, 2011 UT App 416 at 
12 
~ ,r 39 ("Where a duty to inquire further arises, the party is deemed to have notice of 
everything to which such inquiry might have led"). By failing to do so, Sterling cannot 
be a good faith, bona-fide purchaser as a matter of law. 
III. THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT DID NOT QUIET TITLE AS TO CHASE 
Sterling also argues that the Default Judgment "nullified and removed" the Trust 
Deed from the Property. (Appellant Brief at p. 16). Sterling claims that only TBW 
Mortgage was entitled to notice of the Quiet Title Action under paragraph 15 of the Trust 
Deed. (/d.). By naming and serving TBW Mortgage, Sterling maintains that such was 
sufficient to release the Trust Deed. (Id.). Sterling also states that all other ''unknown" 
parties, including Chase, were properly served by publication. (Id. at pp. 17-19). Those 
arguments fail. 
First, on its face the Default Judgment unambiguously quieted title only as to 
i.;) TBW Mortgage. See, Park City Utah Corp. v. Ensign Co., 586 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 
1978) ("If the language of a judgment be clear and unambiguous, it must be enforced as it 
speaks"). The Default Judgment expressly says that "Plaintiffs are awarded quiet title 
judgment against Defendant." (R. I 07-108, emphasis added). The Default Judgment 
defines "Defendant" as "Taylor, Bean & Whitaker," and TBW Mortgage was the only 
named defendant in the Quiet Title Action. Also, nothing in the Default Judgment states 
that it released the Trust Deed from the Property. Therefore, the Default Judgment 
cannot be construed to apply to Chase or any party other than TB W Mortgage. 
13 
Second, under Utah law a quiet title order is only "conclusive against all the 
persons named in the summons and complaint who have been served and against all 
unknown persons as stated in the complaint and summons who have been served by 
publication." Utah Code§ 78B-6-1315(4) (emphasis added)(copy at Addendum D). It is 
undisputed that the McRaes did not name or serve First American Title, MERS, or Chase 
in the Quiet Title Action. By failing to name and serve these parties, legal title to the 
Property remained with First American Title and the beneficial interest of the Trust Deed 
remained with MERS. Likewise, the Default Judgment had no effect on Chase's right to 
service and enforce the Note and the underlying Trust Deed. It is undisputed that Chase 
became the owner of the Note two years before the Default Judgment was entered. All 
that the McRaes accomplished by the Default Judgment was to remove TBW Mortgage 
as the lender, which had no interest in the Property to be quieted anyway since it had long 
since sold the Note. 
Sterling's arguments that personal service on TBW Mortgage and service by 
publication on unknown persons were sufficient notice also fail. Even if the contractual 
language of the Trust Deed required notice only to "Lender" (which, incidentally, was 
Chase at the time of the McRae's lawsuit), due process under the Utah R. Civ. P. 4 and 5, 
and Utah's quiet title statute,§ 78B-6-1315(4), required that all known parties be named 
and personally served with notice of the Quiet Title Action. To the extent that Sterling 
may have been unaware of Chase's interests in the property at the time of its purchase, 
14 
~ Chase's interests would have been discovered by service on the known parties (and as 
such Sterling's arguments that the MERS Milestones were unavailable to them until 
Chase's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed in 2014 are unavailing). Because First 
American Title and MERS were known parties of record, Chase was the known servicer 
of the Note, and any service on MERS would have revealed Chase's interest as the 
Lender at the relevant time, service by publication was insufficient to effectuate service 
on these known parties. 
A case directly on point is Delo v. GMAC Mortgage, LLC, 302 P.3d 658 (Ariz. 
App. 2013). Accord, Commonwealth Property Advocates, LLC v. MERS, 2011 UT App 
232. There, the borrowers executed a Deed of Trust designating MERS as the nominee 
for lender and the beneficiary of the security instrument. When the original lender sold 
the loan to GMAC, the transfer was not recorded in the county records, but was 
i.JJ maintained in the MERS database. Thereafter, the local county filed a tax lien on the 
property and sold the tax lien to Delo. Delo initiated judicial foreclosure proceedings 
against the original lender, recorded a !is pendens on the property, but failed to name or 
serve MERS or GMAC as defendants. Delo obtained a default judgment and became the 
owner of the property. In the meantime, MERS commenced non-judicial foreclosure 
proceedings under the Deed of Trust due to the borrowers' default in payment. GMAC 
was the successful bidder at the foreclosure sale and received a Trustee's Deed granting 
GMAC title to the property. 
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Delo filed a quiet title action against GMAC arguing that he was a bona fide 
purchaser because there was no public record of the assignment of the Deed of Trust to 
GMAC. Delo also argued that MERS was not a necessary party to the foreclosure action 
because MERS is "merely an agent for the lender." The district court agreed with Delo 
and granted summary judgment concluding that, "because Delo had filed a lis pendens 
before any recorded interest of the GMAC Parties, the GMAC Parties had received 
sufficient notice and an opportunity to intervene in Delo's tax-lien foreclosure action." 
The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the district court and held that GMAC 
must prevail because Delo failed to name and serve MERS in the foreclosure action. The 
court reasoned that, "because MERS was designated the lender's nominee under the 
Deed of Trust, the GMAC Parties' interests in the Property were protected by MERS's 
recorded interests." Id at, 12. The court further explained that, "MERS was identified 
in the recorded Deed of Trust, which Delo should have examined in ascertaining what 
parties had a legal or equitable interest in the Property. And through MERS, Delo could 
have identified the GMAC Parties' interests." Id at 115. The court concluded that: 
The Deed of Trust not only expressly identifies MERS as the nominee for 
the lender, but also as beneficiary, and the holder of legal title to the 
Property. And, even if MERS was merely an agent of [ the original lender] 
and its successors, a diligent search for the true holder of the Note, for 
purposes of giving proper notice of the tax-lien foreclosure lawsuit, would 
have included providing notice of the lawsuit to MERS, who then could 
have forwarded it to the current holder of the Note. Delo's recording of the 
lis pendens was a mere gesture that did not satisfy due process notice 
16 
requirements. And, the trial court erred by placing the burden on the 
GMAC Parties to intervene in Dela's tax-lien foreclosure lawsuit, rather 
than on Delo to ascertain those with a legal or equitable interest in the 
Property. 
Id. at ,I 17 ( citations and quotes omitted). 
Just like in Delo, the failure to name or serve MERS, First American Title, or 
vii Chase defeats any claim that the Default Judgment extinguished the Trust Deed. All 
interests separate and apart from TBW Mortgage survived the Default Judgment. 
Moreover, had MERS been served, MERS could have notified Chase of the Quiet Title 
Action in satisfaction of due process. The naming of only TBW Mortgage and the 
subsequent service by publication were "mere gestures" that did not meet due process 
I.id notice requirements. In reality, the McRaes' and Sterling's objective was likely to keep 
Chase and MERS in the dark so they could try to sell the Property free and clear of any 
mortgage liens by referencing the Default Judgment against TBW Mortgage. Why else 
did McRaes continue to make payments to Chase for nearly a year after the Default 
Judgment, until the sale of the Property to a third party was imminent? But the burden 
was on the McRaes and Sterling to diligently ascertain all legal or equitable interests in 
the Property prior to obtaining the Default Judgment. 
Finally, the Default Judgment did not release the Trust Deed because, under Utah 
law, "To succeed in an action to quiet title to real estate, a plaintiff must prevail on the 
strength of his own claim to title and not the weakness of a defendant's title or even its 
total lack of title." Collard v. Nagle Constr., 2002 UT App 306, ,I 18, 57 P.3d 603. In 
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the mortgage-loan context, this requires that the borrower pay the mortgage debt in full. 
See, Marty v. MERS, 2010 WL 4117196 (D. Utah 2010) (rejecting borrower's quiet title 
claim because he relied only on lender's alleged lack of title in trust deed, and not on 
borrower's payment of the mortgage loan). 1 There is no dispute in this case that the last 
payment under the Note was made in October 2012 and that the McRaes are now in 
default. (R. 43, 71-84). Although Sterling has argued that MERS is not challenging the 
default and is not represented in the instant Appeal (Appellant Brief at pp. 13, 17-18), 
these assertions are inapposite. The Default Judgment did not release the Trust Deed 
from the Property, or affect the interests of Chase, MERS, or First American Title, as a 
matter oflaw. 
Notably, Sterling made these identical arguments in the companion case, the 
Woolf Lawsuit, in opposition to Chase's Motion for Summary Judgment filed in that 
case. Just like the District Court in the instant matter, Judge Stone rejected Sterling's 
arguments in the WoolfLawsuit and entered summary judgment in favor of Chase. 
Judge Stone ruled that First American Title and MERS were the only parties under the 
1 See also, Dauenhauer v. Bank of New York Mellon, 562 Fed. Appx. 473, 481(6th Cir. 
2014) ("Because Borrowers have not alleged that they paid their debt in full, they do not 
have the right to obtain title of the property from the trustee"); Benson v. Ocwen Loan 
Servicing LLC, 562 Fed. Appx 567, 571 (9th Cir. 2014) (denying borrower's quiet title 
claim because borrower "has pointed to no evidence that he paid the debt or that he could 
pay it"); Katz v. Cal-Western Reconveyance Corp., 2009 WL 3756337, *4 (E.D.Cal 
2009) ("A basic requirement of an action to quiet title is an allegation that plaintiffs are 
the rightful owners of the property, i.e. that they have satisfied their obligations under the 
Deed of Trust. .. A mortgagor cannot quiet his title against the mortgagee without paying 
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Trust Deed to receive interests in the Property under the original terms of the Trust Deed, 
and that TB W Mortgage as lender had no interest in the Property to be quieted. Judge 
Stone concluded that the Default Judgment did not release the Trust Deed from the 
Property as a matter of law. (See Addendum A). Judge Stone's ruling is consistent with 
the District Court's ruling in the instant matter. 
IV. CHASE HAS A VALID CHAIN OF TITLE 
Sterling argues that Summary Judgment should be reversed because of alleged 
defects in Chase's chain-of-title to the Trust Deed. Sterling relies on the MERS 
Milestones to argue that MERS transferred its beneficial interest under the Trust Deed 
prior to the Assignment to Chase. (Appellant Brief at p. 17). Sterling concludes that 
MERS had no beneficial interest to transfer to Chase in 2013 as a result. (Id.). 
Again, this argument was not preserved below. Sterling's argument at the District 
~ Court was that TB W Mortgage had no interest to transfer after it was extinguished by the 
Default Judgment. Sterling never argued that, nor did the District Court rule on whether, 
MERS had assigned its beneficial interest prior to the 2013 Assignment. See, 
Wohnoutka, 2014 UT App 154 at ,r 4. This novel theory cannot be raised for the first 
time on appeal. 
Regardless, Sterling's argument fails because it misinterprets the MERS 
Milestones. The two entries dated September 7, 2007 and May 27, 2010 show that 
Q respective "Transfer Beneficial Rights" occurred on those dates. However, that 
document does not state that those transfers were from MERS. Rather, the respective 
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transfers were from TB W Mortgage to Bank of America, and then from Bank of America 
to Chase. As set forth in the Trust Deed, MERS remained as the beneficiary as nominee 
for those lenders. It is not until the final entry dated February 15, 2013 that MERS's 
interest in the Trust Deed is stated as being assigned to Chase. That is consistent with the 
Assignment recorded on the Property at that time. Therefore, the chain-of-title under the 
Trust Deed is simply that MERS was the beneficiary as nominee for "Lender and 
Lender's successors and assigns" from 2007 to February 2013, at which time MERS 
assigned the beneficial interest to Chase. 
The chain-of-title of the Note is also undisputed. Sterling failed to produce any 
affirmative evidence below to dispute that Chase acquired the Note in 2010, which was 
prior to the entry of the Default Judgment. Even if Sterling had shown defects in Chase's 
chain of title, they would be immaterial because Chase is in possession of the endorsed-
in-blank Note. (R. 43). Under Utah's Commercial Code, "[w]hen indorsed in blank, an 
instrument becomes payable to bearer and may be negotiated by transfer of possession 
alone until specially indorsed." Utah Code§ 70A-3-205(2)). As such, the holder of the 
endorsed-in-blank note is entitled to enforce the note. See§ 70A-3-301 ("'Person entitled 
to enforce' an instrument means[, inter alia,] the holder of the instrument .... ");§ 70A-la-
201(u)(i) ('"Holder' means[, inter alia,] the person in possession of a negotiable 
instrument that is payable ... to bearer .... "); see also, Commonwealth Prop. Advocates, 
LLC v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 2012 UT App 126, ,r 2 ( applying the foregoing statutes 
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~ to hold that "it is undisputed that Chase was in possession or held the indorsed in blank 
note, [and) as a matter of law Chase was entitled to enforce that note"). Upon negotiation 
of the note, the rights under a Deed of Trust automatically transfer to the note holder by 
operation oflaw. Utah Code§ 57-1-35. Accordingly, physical possession of an 
endorsed-in-blank note alone is sufficient for its enforcement and defeats any 
requirement to otherwise establish the holder's chain-of-title. See, Thomas v. FNMA, 502 
B.R. 344 (10th Cir. BAP 2013) (holding that ambiguities in a chain-of-title are "simply 
irrelevant" when a lender is in possession of an endorsed-in-blank note); Henning v. 
One West Bank FSB, 405 S.W.3d 950 {Tex. App. 2013) (holding that no material fact 
dispute exists when a lender can show "[1] [it] is the legal holder of an existing note, [2] 
the debtor's execution of the note, and [3) that an outstanding balance is due and 
owing"); compare to R. 32, 43, 71-84 (establishing that the McRaes have not made a 
~ payment since October 2012). 
Because no defects to Chase's chain-of-title to both the Note and Trust Deed have 
been shown and are otherwise immaterial, the District Court's Summary Judgment ruling 
should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Chase respectfully requests that the District Court's 
Summary Judgment ruling in favor of Chase be affirmed. 
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DATED: October 19, 2015. 
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH 
James D. Gilson 
J. Tayler Fox 
Attorneys for defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. 
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This matter came on regularly for hearing before the Court on August 26, 2015. Before 
the Court was the July 7, 2015 Motion to Reconsider Denial of Summary Judgment on 
Intervenor Plaintiffs Third Cause of Action ("Chase's Motion to Reconsider") filed by 
Intervenor plaintiff JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. ("Chase"), and the August 3, 2015 Motion to 
Reconsider filed by the Defendants in this case ("Defendants' Cross-Motion to Reconsider"). 
Also before the Court were the May 4, 2015 Rule 56(-f) Motion ("56(f) Motion") and Motion to 
Strike Declaration of Amber Alegria and Exhibits Thereto ("Motion to Strike") filed by 
defendant New Lands Development, LLC ("New Lands"). James D. Gilson and J. Tayler Fox 
appeared on behalf of Chase; Kimberley L. Hansen appeared on behalf ofDM Bunker LLC; 
Dwight Epperson appeared on behalf of Sterling Fiduciaries LLC and Stone Unturned Trust; and 
Shane D. Gosdis appeared on behalf of New Lands. This lawsuit relates to the parties' 
respective interests in real property located at 11213 South Portobello Road, South Jordan, Utah 
(the "Property"). 
On June 29, 2015, the Court entered its Ruling and Order on Chase's April 29, 2014 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Therein, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Chase on Chase's first cause of action for declaratory judgment, and on Chase's second cause of 
action for breach of contract. However, the Court denied summary judgment on Chase's third 
cause of action for foreclosure of the deed of trust securing Chase's loan. Chase moved the 
Court to reconsider its Ruling and Order as it relates to Chase's foreclosure claim. 
Having reviewed the motions and memoranda on file in connection with the foregoing 
motions, and having considered the arguments of counsel, for the reasons set forth by the Court 
on the record at the August 26, 2015 hearing, and by Chase in its memoranda in support of 
vtJ October 02, 2015 01 :49 PM 2 of 8 
Chase's Motion to Reconsider and in support of Chase's Motion for Summary Judgment, and in 
Chase's opposition memoranda to Defendants' Cross-Motion to Reconsider and 56(f) Motion, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that: 
October 02, 2015 01 :49 PM 
I. New Lands's Motion to Strike is granted in part and denied in part. The 
Court finds that on the face of the April 29, 2014 Declaration of JPMorgan 
Chase Bank, N .A. ("Declaration"), Chase has not set forth a sufficient 
basis to show that the records of third parties were incorporated into 
Chase's business records and relied on by Chase. However, Chase's 
declarant, Amber Alegria, is qualified to testify about transactions to 
which Chase was a party, and as to documents that are of public record. 
Therefore, the Motion to Strike is granted as to paragraphs 5 and 6 of the 
Declaration, which are hereby stricken. The Motion to Strike is denied in 
all other respects. 
2. New Lands's 56(t) Motion is denied. The Court finds that there is only 
one chain-of-title involved with the mortgage loan at issue. On April 24, 
2007, a Deed of Trust was recorded in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, as 
Entry No. I 0076085 (the "Trust Deed"), which named Taylor, Bean, & 
Whitaker Mortgage Corp. ("TBW Mortgage") as lender, First American 
Title as trustee, and Mortgage Electronic Registrations Systems 
("MERS"), as nominee for lender and lender's successors and assigns, as 
the beneficiary. First American Title and MERS are the only parties that 
received an interest in the Property under the original terms of the Trust 
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October 02, 2015 01 :49 PM 
Deed. That chain-of-title remained consistent until MERS transferred its 
interest in the Trust Deed to Chase on January 31, 2013 under a Corporate 
Assignment of Deed of Trust recorded in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
as Entry No. 11571462. Defendants' request for additional discovery 
under Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on Chase's chain-
of-title is denied inasmuch as Defendants seek discovery that is simply 
irrelevant given the foregoing undisputed facts. 
3. Chase's Motion to Reconsider, and the underlying Motion for Summary 
Judgment, are granted in all respects. Only two issues of fact are material: 
(1) who has possession of the negotiable instrument evidencing the loan 
obligation, to wit: the April 19, 2007 promissory note (the "Note") 
executed by defendants Kimberly and Kip McRae; and (2) who holds 
senior title to the Property? It is undisputed that Chase is in possession of 
the endorsed-in-blank Note, which has been presented in open court to all 
the parties. See Utah Code§ 70A-3-205(2). It is also undisputed that 
Chase holds senior title to the Property under the Trust Deed. The Trust 
Deed was recorded on April 24, 2007, which was prior to all Defendants' 
interests in the Property and imparted notice to all Defendants. Chase's 
interest under the Trust Deed relates back to the original date of recording. 
The subsequent December 19, 2011 Default Judgment obtained by the 
McRae defendants was only against TBW Mortgage and did nothing to 
quiet title as against MERS and First American Title, who were clearly 
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parties that were known to have interests in the Property. Utah's quiet title 
statute, Utah Code § 78B-6-1315( 4), required that MERS and First 
American Title be served persona11y, and the McRaes' service by 
publication on unknown parties was insufficient to effectuate service on 
MERS and First American Title. Moreover, as lender under the Trust 
Deed, TBW Mortgage had no interest in the Property to be quieted by the 
Default Judgment. Because the Note and Trust Deed have been properly 
transferred and assigned to Chase, Chase is now entitled to enforce those 
instruments through foreclosure of the Property. Accordingly, Chase is 
granted summary judgment on its third cause of action in the Amended 
Complaint. 
4. Chase's Motion for Summary Judgment is also granted as it relates to New 
Lands' Counterclaim. All claims asserted by New Lands against Chase in 
the Counterclaim are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
5. Defendants' Cross-Motion to Reconsider is also denied. 
***END OF ORDER*** 
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CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH 
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October 02, 2015 01 :49 PM 5of8 
Dwight Epperson 
Attorney for defendants Sterling Fiduciaries LLC and 
Stone Unturned Trust 
COHNE KINGHORN 
Kimberley L. Hansen. ___________ _ 
Attorney for defendant DM Bunker, LLC 
GOSDIS LAW, PLC 
Shane D. Gosdis 
Attorney for defendant New Lands Development, UC 
@ October 02, 2015 01:49 PM 
DATED: ____ _ 
DATED:. ____ _ 
DATED: ____ _ 
6 of8 
RULE 7(0 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing proposed ORDER GRANTING 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER CHASE BANK'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND DENYING DEFENDANTS' CROSS-MOTION TO RECONSIDER was served 
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f) on September 14, 2015, on the following: 
Via Email: 
Kimberley L. Hansen 
Cohne Kinghorn 
Attorney for Defendant DM Bunker, LLC 
Jonathan Rudd 
Meagan Rudd 
THE RUDD FIRM, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Benjamin Woolf 
Dwight JL Epperson 
Attorney for Defendants Craig Van Leeuwen, Stone Unturned Trust, and Sterling 
Fiduciaries, LLC 
Shane Gosdis 
Attorney for Iron Horse Fiduciaries, Contract Management Services, Inc., New Lands 
Development LLC, and Lou G. Harris 
Jared Anderson 
Attorney for tenant Steven Bown 
By U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid: 
L. Kip McRae 
PO Box 95168 
South Jordan, Utah 84095 
October 02, 2015 01 :49 PM 
Kimberly McRae 
11451 S Jordan Farm Rd 
South Jordan, UT 84095 
Isl J Tayler Fox 
7 of 8 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing proposed ORDER GRANTING 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER CHASE BANK'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND DENYING DEFENDANTS' CROSS-MOTION TO RECONSIDER was served on 
September 28, 2015, on the following: 
Via ECF Notification: 
Kimberley L. Hansen 
Cohoe Kinghorn 
Attorney for Defendant DM Bunker, LLC 
Jonathan Rudd 
Meagan Rudd 
THE RUDD FIRM, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Benjamin Woolf 
Dwight JL Epperson 
Attorney for Defendants Craig Van Leeuwen, Stone Unturned Trust, and Sterling 
Fiduciaries, LLC 
Shane Gosdis 
Attorney for Iron Horse Fiduciaries, Contract Management Services, Inc., New Lands 
Development LLC, and Lou G. Harris 
Jared Anderson 
Attorney for tenant Steven Bown 
By U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid: 
L. Kip McRae 
PO Box 95168 
South Jordan, Utah 84095 
(;) October 02, 2015 01:49 PM 
Kimberly McRae 
11451 S Jordan Fann Rd 
South Jordan, UT 84095 
Isl.! Tayler Fox 
8 of 8 
ADDENDUMB 
@ 
JAMES D. GILSON (5472) Qgilson@cnmlaw.com) 
J. TAYLER FOX (12092) (jtfox@cnmlaw.com) 
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH 
Zions Bank Building, Suite 900 
IO East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
Telephone: (801) 530-7300 
Facsimile: (801) 364-9127 
Attorneys for Intervenor Plaintiff JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STA TE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
BENJAMIN WOOLF, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STERLING FIDCUIARIES, LLC, a Utah 
limited liability company; DM BUNKER, 
LLC, a Utah limited liability company; L. KIP 
MCRAE, an individual; KIMBERLY A. 
MCRAE, an individual; CRAIG VAN 
LEEUWEN, an individual; and DOES 1-20, 
Defendants. 
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., 
Intervenor Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STERLING FIDCUIARIES, LLC, a Utah 
limited liability company; DM BUNKER, 
LLC, a Utah limited liability company; L. KIP 
MCRAE, an individual; KIMBERLY A. 
MCRAE, an individual, STONE UNTURNED 
TRUST; 4MACBOYS, LLC, a Utah limited 
liability company; NEW LANDS 
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, a Utah limited 
liability company, 
Defendants. 
Q October 13, 2015 01 :09 PM 
DECREE OF FORECLOSURE 
Civil No. 130900470 
Judge Stone 
--- - ----- --- -----~ 
1 of 5 
The Court, having granted summary judgment in favor of intervenor plaintiff JPMorgan 
Chase Bank, N.A. ("Chase") on all claims in Chase's Amended Complaint, 
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES that: 
October 13, 2015 01 :09 PM 
1. The April 24, 2007 Deed of Trust recorded in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, as Entry No. 10076085 (the "Trust Deed") is a good and paramount 
lien upon real property located at 11213 South Portobello Road, South 
Jordan, Utah (the "Property"), which lien is superior in all respects to the 
rights, title, interests, and claims of all defendants and any persons 
claiming by, through or under said parties, or any of them; 
2. The Property, or such portion thereof as may be sufficient to pay the 
amounts found to be due and owing under the promissory note and the 
Court's June 29, 2015 Ruling and Order, together with interest thereon at 
the legal rate, and accruing costs herein, and expenses of sale, shall be sold 
at public auction by the Sheriff of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in the 
manner prescribed by law for such sales; 
3. The Sheriff, if and when the Property is sold, out of the proceeds of such 
sale, shall retain first the Sheriffs costs, disbursements, and commissions; 
next, apply the balance of the proceeds of such sale first to Chase, or its 
attorneys, in payment of the accrued and accruing costs of this action; 
second, to the payment of the attorneys' fees of Chase incurred with 
respect to this action; third, to payment of the amount owing to Chase for 
principal, interest, costs and expenses, taxes, assessments, and insurance 
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premiums, together with accrued interest thereon or so much of said sums 
as said proceeds will pay; and fourth, the surplus, if any, shall be 
accounted for and paid over to the Clerk of this Court subject to this 
Court's further order; 
4. All persons having an interest in the Property shall have the right, upon 
producing satisfactory proof of interest, to redeem the same within the 
time provided by law for such redemption; that from and after the 
expiration of the applicable periods of redemption as provided by law, the 
defendants above named, and each of them, and all persons claiming by, 
through, or under them, be forever barred, and foreclosed of all right, title, 
interest and estate in and to the Property and from and after the delivery of 
the Sheriffs Deed to the Property, the grantee named therein be given 
possession thereof; 
5. Any rights Chase has to pursue any deficiency that results after due and 
proper application of the proceeds of such sale are hereby reserved for and 
to be asserted in the bankruptcy proceedings pending for Chase's 
borrowers, defendants Kimberly McRae and Kip McRae, as may be 
allowed by the Bankruptcy Code and other applicable law; 
6. The Property is more particularly described as: 
Lot 17, Nelson Farms Subdivision, According to the Official Plat Thereof on File and Of 
Record in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office. 
Parcel No. 27-22-177-017 
***END OF ORDER*** 
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LLC, a Utah limited liability company; L. KIP 
MCRAE, an individual; KIMBERLY A. 
MCRAE, an individual; CRAIG VAN 
LEEUWEN, an individual; and DOES 1-20, 
Defendants. 
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., 
Intervenor Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STERLING FIDCUIARIES, LLC, a Utah 
limited liability company; DM BUNKER, 
LLC, a Utah limited liability company; L. KIP 
MCRAE, an individual; KIMBERLY A. 
MCRAE, an individual, STONE UNTURNED 
TRUST; 4MACBOYS, LLC, a Utah limited 
liability company; NEW LANDS 
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, a Utah limited 
liability company, 
ORDER OF SALE 
Civil No. 130900470 
Judge Stone 
-- ~·1 .. , ... ••'. ~ ""1/·· 
-·-•. .: .. ~s,.1,::-,,,;! 
i _______________ Defendants. 
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TO THE SHERIFF OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH: 
WHEREAS, the Court, having granted summary judgment in favor of intervenor plaintiff 
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. ("Chase") on all claims in Chase's Amended Complaint, and 
having entered a Decree of Foreclosure (the "Decree of Foreclosure") against the above-named 
defendants, which Decree of Foreclosure was duly recorded and docketed in the Clerk's office 
and a certified copy of the Decree of Foreclosure is attached hereto as Exhibit A and by this 
reference made a part hereof, 
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES THAT the real property described in 
the Decree of Foreclosure be sold at public auction. 
NOW, THEREFORE, you, the Sheriff of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, are hereby 
commanded and required to proceed to notice for sale, and to sell the real property described in 
the Decree of Foreclosure and apply the proceeds of the sale as directed in the Decree of 
Foreclosure, and you shall make and file your report of the sale with the Clerk of this Court 
within sixty ( 60) days from date of your receipt thereof, and you shall do all things according to 
the terms and requirements of the Decree of Foreclosure, and the applicable provisions and 
requirements of law. 
***END OF ORDER*** 
THE COURT'S SIGNATURE APPEARS ABOVE 
October 13, 2015 01 :09 PM 2 of 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing proposed ORDER OF SALE was 
served on September 28, 2015, 2015, on the following: 
Via ECF Notification: 
Kimberley L. Hansen 
Cohne Kinghorn 
Attorney for Defendant DM Bunker, LLC 
Jonathan Rudd 
Meagan Rudd 
THE RUDD FIRM, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Benjamin Woolf 
Dwight JL Epperson 
Attorney for Defendants Craig Van Leeuwen, Stone Unturned Trust, and Sterling 
Fiduciaries, LLC 
Shane Gosdis 
Attorney for Iron Horse Fiduciaries, Contract Management Services, Inc., New Lands 
Development LLC, and Lou G. Harris 
Jared Anderson 
Attorney for tenant Steven Bown 
By U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid: 
L. Kip McRae 
PO Box 95168 
South Jordan, Utah 84095 
i;.i October 13, 2015 01:09 PM 
Kimberly McRae 
11451 S Jordan Farm Rd 
South Jordan, UT 84095 
Isl J. Tayler Fox 
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ADDENDUMD 
vJ § 78B-6-1315. Judgment on default-Court must require ... , UT ST§ 78B-6-1315 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 78b. Judicial Code 
Chapter 6. Particular Proceedings (Refs & Annos) 
Part 13. Quiet 'I'itle (Refs & Annos) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-6-1315 
Formerly cited as UT ST §78-40-13 
§ 78B-6-1315. Judgment on default--Court must require evidence--Conclusiveness of judgment 
Currentness 
(1) lfthe summons has been served and the time for answering has expired, the court shall proceed to hear the cause as in 
...iP other cases. 
(2) The court may examine and determine the legality of the plaintiffs title and the title and claims of all the defendants and 
all unknown persons. 
(3) The court may not enter any judgment by default against unknown defendants, but in all cases shall require evidence of 
plaintiffs title and possession and hear the evidence offered respecting the claims and title of any of the defendants. The court 
may enter judgment in accordance with the evidence and the law only after hearing all the evidence. 
(4) The judgment shall be conclusive against all the persons named in the summons and complaint who have been served and 
against all unknown persons as stated in the complaint and summons who have been served by publication. 
Credits 
~ Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1084, eff. Feb. 7, 2008. 
Notes of Decisions (S} 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-6-1315, UT ST§ 78B-6-1315 
Current through 201 S First Special Session 
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